Executive Order 13865: Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses
President: Donald J. Trump
Set a coordinated federal approach to risks from electromagnetic pulses, assigning science, security and infrastructure agencies assessment, planning and resilience tasks.
Status: In effect. Sources: Official source · Official source · Official source.
Is Executive Order 13865 still in effect? Yes. Executive Order 13865 of March 26, 2019 remains unrevoked. The Department of Energy continues to identify it as an authority for electromagnetic-pulse resilience, and the order's research and mitigation duties include recurring updates rather than a sunset date.
What does Executive Order 13865 do?
EO 13865 directed agencies to assess electromagnetic-pulse risks, improve resilience of critical infrastructure and coordinate research, preparedness and response planning.
Later evidence reviewed September 24, 2026: CISA’s year-in-review report describes EMP program work in response to EO 13865, including a status report. It establishes agency follow-through, not a complete assessment of grid resilience. CISA 2020 year in review.
Before and after
Before the order
Agencies addressed infrastructure resilience under existing emergency programs.
After the order
CISA’s year-in-review report describes EMP program work in response to EO 13865, including a status report. It establishes agency follow-through, not a complete assessment of grid resilience.
Who had to do what
| Agency / official | What the signed order directed | Deadline / timing |
|---|---|---|
| Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), through National Security Council staff | Coordinate executive-branch EMP risk work in consultation with OSTP; report progress, capability gaps and recommendations to the president. | Annually for the report; coordination ongoing. |
| Office of Science and Technology Policy Director, through the National Science and Technology Council | Coordinate EMP research; assess agency research needs; consult on test-data review, gap-filling plans, technology reports and other specified assessments. | Research-needs assessment annually; consultation follows the associated DHS schedules. |
| Secretary of State | Lead international diplomatic coordination on EMP resilience and strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence with Defense and relevant agencies. | No separate deadline stated. |
| Secretary of Defense | Improve EMP detection, attribution and warning; provide natural-EMP observations for defense; research, test, model and protect military systems; update standards; share expertise; incorporate EMP attacks into planning and defend against external EMP threats. Coordinate DHS risk assessments, technology analysis, mitigation plans and communications assessment; identify technology gaps; pilot hardening of a strategic installation and report cost/effectiveness. | DHS risk assessment within one year of March 26, 2019, then quadrennially; technology report within one year, then every two years; military pilot within 180 days after section 6(c)(i) activities, and pilot report within 180 days after test completion; other consultation follows DHS milestones. |
| Secretary of the Interior | Support capabilities for understanding magnetic-field variations and complete a contiguous-US magnetotelluric survey. | Survey within four years of March 26, 2019; no separate deadline for other support. |
| Secretary of Commerce | Provide natural-EMP observations, forecasts and related products outside Defense’s remit; improve forecasting and commercial EMP standards; consult on communications-infrastructure assessment. | Ongoing services; communications consultation within 180 days after identification of vulnerable priority infrastructure. |
| Secretary of Energy | Research EMP sources, electrical-grid coupling and failures, develop pilots, and coordinate energy-sector mitigation; review standards and create/update quantitative EMP benchmarks; coordinate DHS risk assessments, technology-gap analysis and mitigation planning; consult on military hardening. | Benchmarks within one year of March 26, 2019 and thereafter as appropriate; risk/technology/mitigation consultation follows corresponding DHS and Defense milestones. |
| Secretary of Homeland Security | Distribute threat information, coordinate resilience and response/recovery, incorporate EMPs in exercises, research civilian infrastructure and maintain survivable public communications. Develop risk assessments with Defense/Energy; identify critical functions, assess vulnerabilities and send the list through APNSA; review test data, identify gaps and develop a cross-sector plan; report technology options and gaps; pilot civilian mitigation; identify private-sector participation mechanisms; develop, implement and update a mitigation plan and report additional resource/authority needs. Assess communications impacts with Defense, Commerce and FCC, providing recommendations to the Homeland Security/Counterterrorism deputy assistant and OSTP. | Risk assessment within one year of March 26, 2019, then quadrennially. Critical-function list within 90 days; vulnerability assessment within one year after that identification. Test-data review within 180 days after vulnerability identification; gap plan within 180 days after gaps identified. Technology report within one year, then every two years. Civilian pilot within 180 days after benchmark and technology-report activities; mitigation plan within 90 days after civilian pilot. Private-sector mechanisms within one year; communications assessment within 180 days after vulnerability identification; lists/plans updated as needed. |
| Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator, under Homeland Security | Review and update federal EMP response plans, programs and procedures with appropriate sector-specific agencies. | Within 180 days of March 26, 2019. |
| Director of National Intelligence | Coordinate intelligence assessments of adversarial EMP capability and likelihood; provide threat assessments supporting sector-specific agencies’ quadrennial risk assessments. | Support the first risk assessment within one year of March 26, 2019 and quadrennial assessments thereafter; no separate intelligence deadline. |
| Heads of sector-specific agencies | Coordinate with DHS on information sharing, critical-function identification, vulnerability/data assessments, gap plans, research, response and private-sector participation. | Associated DHS milestones; ongoing information sharing. |
| Heads of agencies supporting National Essential Functions | Include EMP mitigation, response and recovery in all-hazards preparedness; update operational plans. | Operational updates within 180 days after section 6(e)(i) federal-response updates; preparedness ongoing. |
| Heads of agencies identified in the cross-sector gap plan | Implement the EMP test-data gap plan with private-sector collaboration where appropriate. | After the section 6(b)(ii) plan; no separate implementation deadline. |
| Federal Communications Commission Chairman | Consult with DHS, Defense and Commerce on EMP effects on critical communications and operational-plan recommendations. | Assessment due within 180 days after vulnerable priority infrastructure is identified. |
Source: Signed Federal Register text.
What happened next
EO 13865 signed; its Federal Register publication followed.
Legal and source detail
How it works legally
The Federal Register record identifies EO 13865, its title and signing date. CISA’s year-in-review report describes EMP program work in response to EO 13865, including a status report. It establishes agency follow-through, not a complete assessment of grid resilience. The linked source supports this particular later event; it does not establish every present legal or operational effect.
Sources by type
If a source is unavailable, first check the cited publisher or another official repository. The cited publisher remains the authority.
Primary and official sources
Orders, laws, court records and official implementation material.
- CISA 2020 year in review (opens in a new tab) Official record
How we checked this
Last checked against the sources above on September 24, 2026. How we research →